Further improve readability

This commit is contained in:
shchmue 2022-11-02 18:36:39 -07:00
parent cc4f8bf1f6
commit c7d90ec8ca
8 changed files with 195 additions and 207 deletions

View file

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2022 shchmue
* Copyright (c) 2018 Atmosphère-NX
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
@ -27,6 +28,15 @@
extern hekate_config h_cfg;
bool check_keyslot_access() {
u8 test_data[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {0};
const u8 test_ciphertext[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {0};
se_aes_key_set(KS_AES_ECB, "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f", SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(KS_AES_ECB, DECRYPT, test_data, test_ciphertext);
return memcmp(test_data, "\x7b\x1d\x29\xa1\x6c\xf8\xcc\xab\x84\xf0\xb8\xa5\x98\xe4\x2f\xa6", SE_KEY_128_SIZE) == 0;
}
bool test_rsa_keypair(const void *public_exponent, const void *private_exponent, const void *modulus) {
u32 plaintext[SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE / 4] = {0},
ciphertext[SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE / 4] = {0},
@ -46,13 +56,82 @@ bool test_rsa_keypair(const void *public_exponent, const void *private_exponent,
bool test_eticket_rsa_keypair(const rsa_keypair_t *keypair) {
// Unlike the SSL RSA key, we don't need to check the gmac - we can just verify the public exponent
// and test the keypair since we have the modulus
if ((read_be_u32(keypair->public_exponent, 0) != RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) ||
(!test_rsa_keypair(keypair->public_exponent, keypair->private_exponent, keypair->modulus))) {
if ((byte_swap_32(keypair->public_exponent) != RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) ||
(!test_rsa_keypair(&keypair->public_exponent, keypair->private_exponent, keypair->modulus))
) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
// _mgf1_xor() and rsa_oaep_decode were derived from Atmosphère
static void _mgf1_xor(void *masked, u32 masked_size, const void *seed, u32 seed_size)
{
u8 cur_hash[0x20] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
u8 hash_buf[0xe4] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
u32 hash_buf_size = seed_size + 4;
memcpy(hash_buf, seed, seed_size);
u32 round_num = 0;
u8 *p_out = (u8 *)masked;
while (masked_size) {
u32 cur_size = MIN(masked_size, 0x20);
for (u32 i = 0; i < 4; i++)
hash_buf[seed_size + 3 - i] = (round_num >> (8 * i)) & 0xff;
round_num++;
se_calc_sha256_oneshot(cur_hash, hash_buf, hash_buf_size);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < cur_size; i++) {
*p_out ^= cur_hash[i];
p_out++;
}
masked_size -= cur_size;
}
}
u32 rsa_oaep_decode(void *dst, u32 dst_size, const void *label_digest, u32 label_digest_size, u8 *buf, u32 buf_size) {
if (dst_size <= 0 || buf_size < 0x43 || label_digest_size != 0x20)
return 0;
bool is_valid = buf[0] == 0;
u32 db_len = buf_size - 0x21;
u8 *seed = buf + 1;
u8 *db = seed + 0x20;
_mgf1_xor(seed, 0x20, db, db_len);
_mgf1_xor(db, db_len, seed, 0x20);
is_valid &= memcmp(label_digest, db, 0x20) ? 0 : 1;
db += 0x20;
db_len -= 0x20;
int msg_ofs = 0;
int looking_for_one = 1;
int invalid_db_padding = 0;
int is_zero;
int is_one;
for (int i = 0; i < db_len; ) {
is_zero = (db[i] == 0);
is_one = (db[i] == 1);
msg_ofs += (looking_for_one & is_one) * (++i);
looking_for_one &= ~is_one;
invalid_db_padding |= (looking_for_one & ~is_zero);
}
is_valid &= (invalid_db_padding == 0);
const u32 msg_size = MIN(dst_size, is_valid * (db_len - msg_ofs));
memcpy(dst, db + msg_ofs, msg_size);
return msg_size;
}
// Equivalent to spl::GenerateAesKek
void generate_aes_kek(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_kek, const void *kek_source, u32 generation, u32 option) {
bool device_unique = GET_IS_DEVICE_UNIQUE(option);